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Abstract
In spite of its relevance to the origin of complex networks, the interplay between form and function and its role during
network formation remains largely unexplored. While recent studies introduce dynamics by considering rewiring processes
of a pre-existent network, we study network growth and formation by proposing an evolutionary preferential attachment
model, its main feature being that the capacity of a node to attract new links depends on a dynamical variable governed in
turn by the node interactions. As a specific example, we focus on the problem of the emergence of cooperation by
analyzing the formation of a social network with interactions given by the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The resulting networks show
many features of real systems, such as scale-free degree distributions, cooperative behavior and hierarchical clustering.
Interestingly, results such as the cooperators being located mostly on nodes of intermediate degree are very different from
the observations of cooperative behavior on static networks. The evolutionary preferential attachment mechanism points to
an evolutionary origin of scale-free networks and may help understand similar feedback problems in the dynamics of
complex networks by appropriately choosing the game describing the interaction of nodes.
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Introduction
In the last few years, it has been increasingly realized that there
are many situations which are not well described by well-mixed
(mean-field) models, lattices and uniformly distributed spatial
models. This is the case with the majority of the so called complex
systems, that are better characterized by what is generally known
as complex networks [1,2]. In many of these networks, the
distribution of the number of interactions, k, that an individual
shares with the rest of the elements of the system, P(k), is found to
follow a power-law, P(k),k
2c, with 2,c,3 in most cases. The
ubiquity in Nature of these so-called scale-free (SF) networks has
led scientists to propose many models aimed at reproducing the SF
degree distribution [1,2]. Most of the existing approaches are
based on growth rules that depend on the instantaneous
topological properties of the network and therefore neglect the
connection of the structural evolution and the particular function
of the network. This is the case with the celebrated ‘‘preferential
attachment rule’’ [3], that posits that new nodes attach to the
existing ones with probability proportional to their degree.
However, accumulated evidence suggests, moreover, that form
follows function [4] and that the formation of the network is also
related to the dynamical states of its components through a
feedback mechanism that shapes its structure.
On the other hand, a paradigmatic case study of the structure
and dynamics of complex systems is that of social networks. In
these systems, it is particularly relevant to understand how
cooperative behavior emerges. The mathematical approach to
model the (cooperative versus defective) interactions is usually
tackled under the general framework of evolutionary game theory
through diverse social dilemmas [5]. In the general case it is the
individual benefit rather than the overall welfare what drives the
system evolution. The emergence of cooperation in natural and
social systems has been the subject of intense research recently [6–
17]. These works are based either on the assumption of an
underlying, given static network (or two static, separate networks
for interaction and imitation [18]) or a coevolution and rewiring
starting from a fully developed network that already includes all
the participating elements. The results show that if the well-mixed
population hypothesis is abandoned, so that individuals only
interact with their neighbors, cooperation is often promoted on
heterogeneous networks, specifically on SF networks. However,
the main questions remain unanswered: Are cooperative behavior
and structural properties of networks related or linked in any way?
If so, how? Moreover, if SF networks are best suited to support
cooperation, then, where did they come from? What are the
mechanisms that shape the structure of the system?
To contribute to answering those questions, in this paper we
analyze the growth and formation of complex networks by
coupling the network formation rules to the dynamical states of the
elements of the system. As we have already mentioned, many
mechanisms have been proposed for constructing complex scale-
free networks similar to those observed in natural, social and
technological systems from purely topological arguments (for
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available in the literature [1,2]). As those works do not include
information on the specific function or origin of the network, it is
very difficult to discuss the origin of the observed networks on the
basis of those models, hence motivating the question we are going
to address. The fact that the existing approaches consider
separately the two directions of the feedback loop between the
function and form of a complex system calls for a new mechanism
where the network grows coupled to the dynamical features of its
components. Our aim here is to introduce for the first time an
attempt in this direction, by linking the growth of the network to
the dynamics taking place among its nodes.
Thus, our model combines two ideas in a novel manner:
preferential attachment and evolutionary game dynamics. Indeed,
with the problem of the emergence of cooperation as a specific
application in mind, we consider that the nodes of the network are
individuals involved in a social dilemma and that newcomers are
preferentially linked to nodes with high fitness, the latter being
proportional to the payoffs obtained in the game. In this way, the
fitness of an element is not imposed as an external constraint
[19,20], but rather it is the result of the dynamical evolution of the
system. At the same time, the network is not exogenously imposed
as a starting point but instead it grows from a small seed and
acquires its structure during its formation process. Finally, we
stress that this is not yet another preferential attachment model in
so far as the quantity that favors linking of new nodes has no direct
relation with the instantaneous topology of the network. In fact, as
we will see, the main result of this interplay is the formation of
homogeneous and heterogeneous networks that share a number of
topological features with real world networks such as a high
clustering and degree-degree correlations. Remarkably, the set of
nodes sustaining the observed aggregate behavior is very different
from that arising in a complex but otherwise static network. As a
particular but most relevant conclusion, we find that the
mechanism we propose not only explains why heterogeneous
networks are tailored to sustain cooperation, but also provides an
evolutionary mechanism for their origin.
Evolutionary Preferential Attachment model
Our model naturally incorporates an intrinsic feedback between
dynamics and topology. The growth of the network starts at time
t=0 with a core of m0 fully connected nodes. New elements are
incorporated to the network and attached to m existing nodes with
a probability that depends on the dynamics of each node. In
particular, we consider that the dynamics is dictated by the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. In this two-players game, every
node initially adopts with the same probability [21] one of the two
available strategies, cooperation C or defection D. At equally
spaced time intervals (denoted by tD) each node i of the network
plays with its ki(t) neighbors and the obtained payoffs are
considered to be the measure of its evolutionary fitness, fi(t). There
are three possible situations for each link in the network: (i) if two
cooperators meet both receive R, when (ii) two defectors play both
receive P, while (iii) if a cooperator and a defector compite the
former receives S and the latter obtains T. The four payoffs are
ordered as T=b.R=1.P=S=0. After playing, every node i
compares its evolutionary fitness (payoff) with that corresponding
to a randomly chosen neighbor j.I ffj(t).fi(t) node i adopts the
strategy of player j with probability [22]
Pi~
fj t ðÞ {fi t ðÞ
b:max ki t ðÞ ,kj t ðÞ
   : ð1Þ
The growth of the network proceeds by adding a new node with
m links to the preexisting ones at equally spaced time intervals
(denoted by tT). The probability that any node i in the network
receives one of the m new links is
Pi t ðÞ ~
1{ezefi t ðÞ
PNt ðÞ
j~1 1{ezefj t ðÞ
   , ð2Þ
where N(t) is the size of the network at time t. The parameter e M
[0,1) thus controls the weight of the fi(t)’s during the growth of the
network. When e.0, nodes with fi(t)?0 are preferentially chosen.
The growth of the network as defined above is thus linked to an
evolutionary dynamics and controlled by the parameter e and the
two associated time scales (tT and tD). When e.0, referred to as
the weak selection limit [14], the network growth is independent of
the evolutionary dynamics as all nodes are basically equiprobable.
Alternatively, in the strong selection limit, eR1, the fittest players
(highest payoffs) are much more likely to attract the newcomers.
Therefore, Eq. (2) can be viewed as an ‘‘evolutionary preferential
attachment’’ mechanism. We have carried out numerical simulations
of the model exploring the (e, b)-space. In what follows, we focus
on the results obtained when tD/tT.1, namely, the network
growth is faster than the evolutionary dynamics [23]. Taking
tT=1 as the reference time, networks are generated by adding
nodes every time step, while they play at discrete times given by
tD.A stD.tT, the linking procedure is done with the payoffs
obtained the last time the nodes played [24]. All results for each
value of b and e reported have been averaged over at least 10
3
realizations and the number of links of a newcomer is taken to be
m=2, whereas m0=3. The reader can find a code used to generate
the networks (Text S1) as well as information about how to use it
(Text S2) in the Supporting Information material. Three of the
generated networks are depicted in Fig. 1 for three different values
of the temptation to defect. The heterogeneous character of these
networks is evident from the figure.
Results
The dependence of the degree distribution on e is shown in
Fig. 2 for b=1.5. As can be seen, the weak selection limit produces
homogeneous networks characterized by a tail that decays
exponentially fast with k. Alternatively, when e is large, scale-free
networks arise. Although this might a priori be expected from the
definition of the growth rules, this needs not be the case: Indeed, it
must be taken into account that in a one-shot PD game defection is
the best strategy regardless of the opponent strategy. However, if
the network dynamics evolves into a state in which all players (or a
large part of the network) are defectors, they will often play against
themselves and their payoffs will be reduced. The system’s
dynamics will then end up in a state close to an all-D configuration
rendering fi(t)=0;i M [1, N(t)] in Eq. (2). From this point on, new
nodes will attach randomly to other existing nodes [see Eq. (2)]
and therefore no hubs can come out. This turns out not to be the
case, which indicates that for having some degree of heterogeneity,
a nonzero level of cooperation is needed. Conversely, the
heterogeneous character of the system provides a feedback
mechanism for the survival of cooperators that would not
outcompete defectors otherwise.
The degree of heterogeneity of the networks in the strong
selection limit depends slightly on b. The results indicate that when
eR1, networks with the highest degree of heterogeneity,
corresponding to the largest values of b, are not those with
maximal cooperation levels. In Fig. 3, we have represented the
average level of cooperation, Æcæ, as a function of the two model
Complex Cooperative Networks
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value of b.1, the level of cooperation increases. In particular, in
the strong selection limit Æcæ attains its maximum value. This is a
somewhat counterintuitive result as in the limit eR1, new nodes
are preferentially linked to those with the highest payoffs, which
for the PD game, should correspond to defectors. However, the
population achieves the highest value of Æcæ. On the other hand,
higher levels of cooperation are achieved in heterogeneous rather
than in homogeneous topologies, which is consistent with previous
findings [6–8].
The interplay between the local structure of the network and the
hierarchical organization of cooperation is highly nontrivial.
Contrary to what has been reported for static scale-free networks
[6,8], Fig. 4 shows that as the temptation to defect increases, the
likelihood that cooperators occupy the hubs decreases. Indeed,
during network growth, cooperators are localized neither at the
hubs nor at the lowly connected nodes, but in intermediate degree
classes. It is important to realize that this is a new effect that
originates in the competition between network growth and the
evolutionary dynamics. In particular, it highlights the differences
between the microscopic organization in the steady state for the
PD game in static networks with that found when the network is
evolving. We will come back to this question in the Discussion
section below.
To confirm the robustness of the networks generated by
evolutionary preferential attachment, let us consider the realistic
situation that after incorporating a (possibly large) number of
participants, network growth stops when a given size N is reached,
and that afterward only evolutionary dynamics takes place. In
Fig. 5, we compare the average level of cooperation Æcæ when the
Figure 2. Degree distributions obtained for several values of e
for b=1.5. A transition from homogeneous to SF networks is evident.
The networks are made up of 10
3 nodes with Ækæ=4 and tD=10tT.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002449.g002
Figure 3. In the bottom panel, we have depicted the (color-
coded) average level of cooperation, Æcæ, as a function of the
temptation to defect b and the selection pressure e. The
networks are those of Fig. 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002449.g003
Figure 4. Probability that a node with connectivity k plays as a
cooperator for different values of b in the strong selection limit
(e=0.99) at the end of the growth of a network with N=1000
nodes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002449.g004
Figure 1. Examples of the networks generated using the evolutionary preferential attachment algorithm. The networks shown
correspond to values of b equal to 1 (a), 2 (b) and 3 (c) in the strong selection limit. Red nodes stand for cooperators and blue ones represent
defectors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002449.g001
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after allowing the evolutionary dynamics to evolve many more
time steps Æcæ‘ (without attaching new nodes). The green area
indicates the region of the parameter b where the level of
cooperation increases with respect to that at the moment the
network stops growing. On the contrary, the red zone shows that
for b.2.5, cooperative behavior does not survive and the system
dynamics evolves to an all-D state. The increment of Æcæ when
going from the steady state reached during network growth to the
stationary regime attained once the underlying structure is static,
has its roots on the fixation of cooperation in high degree classes,
thus recovering the picture described in [8]. On the other hand,
when b.2.5, the few cooperators present in the growing network
are not able to invade the hubs and finally, after a few more
generations, cooperation is extinguished yielding Æcæ‘=0. This
result highlights the phenomenological difference between playing
simultaneously to the growth of the underlying network and
playing on fixed, static networks.
Another striking feature emerging from the interaction between
network growth and the evolutionary dynamics is captured in
Fig. 6, where the clustering coefficient, CC, has been represented
as a function of the nodes degrees in the strong selection limit for
several values of b. This coefficient measures the ratio of the
number of triangles existing on the network over the total possible
number of triangles, which relates to the possibility that a node
connecting to a neighbor of another is also connected to this last
one. Specifically, we will look at CC(k), i.e., the way this coefficient
depends on the degree of the node. Interestingly enough, the
dependence of CC(k) is consistent with a hierarchical organization
expressed by the power law CC(k),k
2b, a statistical feature found
to describe many real-world networks [2]. The behavior of CC(k)i n
Fig. 6 can be understood by recalling that in scale-free networks,
cooperators are not extinguished even for large values of b if they
organize into clusters of cooperators that provide the group with a
stable source of benefits [8].
Discussion
Having presented our main simulation results, we now discuss
them in detail and provide an interpretation of our observations
that allows an understanding of the model behavior. To begin
with, let us consider the emergence of cooperation in the resulting
network in the strong selection limit (eR1). The organization of
the cooperator nodes explains why cooperation survives and
constitutes a unique positive feedback mechanism for the survival
of cooperation. For simplicity, let us focus on how cycles of length
3 (i.e., those contributing to CC) arise and grow. When a new node
j enters the network, it will preferentially attach to m (recall we are
using m=2) nodes with the highest payoff. Two situations are
likely. On the one hand, it may link to a defector hub with a high
payoff. As the newcomer receives less payoff than the hub, it will
sooner or later imitate its strategy and therefore will get trapped
playing as a defector with fj=0. Subsequently, node j will not
attract any links during network growth. On the other hand, if the
new node attaches to a cooperator cluster, the other source of high
payoff, and forms a triad with the cluster elements, two outcomes
are possible depending on its initial strategy. If the newly attached
node plays as a defector, the triad may eventually be invaded by
defectors and may end up in the long run in a state where the
nodes have no capacity to receive new links. Conversely, if it plays
as a cooperator, the group will be reinforced, both in its robustness
against defector invasion and in its overall fitness to attract new
links, i.e., playing as a cooperator while taking part in a successful
(high fitness) cooperator cluster reinforces its future success, while
playing as a defector undermines its future fitness and leads to
dynamically (and topologically) frozen (fi=0) structures, so that
defection cannot take long-term advantage from cooperator
clusters. Therefore, cooperator clusters that emerge from cooper-
ator triads to which new cooperators are attached can then
continue to grow if more cooperators are attracted or even if
defectors attach to the nodes whose connectivity verifies k.mb.
Moreover, the stability of cooperator clusters and its global fitness
grow with their size, specially for their members with higher
degree, and naturally favors the formation of triads among its
components. Note, additionally, that it follows from the above
mechanism that a node of degree k is a vertex of (k21) triangles
and then CC k ðÞ ~
k{1 ðÞ
k 1{1 ðÞ =2~2=k, the sort of functional form for
the clustering coefficient reported in Fig. 6.
Another interesting phenomenon arising from our model is the
fact, previously unobserved, that cooperators occupy the nodes
with intermediate degree and the hubs are defectors, in contrast
with the simulations on static networks [8,9]. To address this issue
we have developed a simple analytical argument. Let kc
i be the
Figure 5. Degree of cooperation when the last node of the
network is incorporated, Æcæ, and the average fraction of
cooperators observed when the system is time-evolved Æcæ‘
after the network growth ends. Both magnitudes are shown as a
function of b for tD=10tT. See the text for further details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002449.g005
Figure 6. Dependence of the clustering coefficient CC(k),k
2b
with the nodes’ degrees for different values of b in the strong
selection limit. The straight line is a guide to the eye and corresponds
to k
21.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002449.g006
Complex Cooperative Networks
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 June 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 6 | e2449number of cooperator neighbors of a given node i. Its fitness is
f d
i ~bkc
i, if node i is a defector, and f c
i ~kc
i, if it is a cooperator.
The value of kc
i is expected to change due to both network growth
(node accretion flow, at a pace of one new node each time unit tT)
and imitation processes that take place at a pace tD. We will focus
on the case in which tD is much larger than tT. The expected
increase of fitness is
Dfi~DflowfizDevolfi, ð3Þ
where Dflow means the variation of fitness in node i due to the
newcomers flow, and Devol stands for the change in fitness due to
changes of neighbors’ strategies. The above expression would lead
to an expected increase in kc
i given by
kc
i tztD ðÞ {kc
i t ðÞ ~Dkc
i~Dflowkc
izDevolkc
i: ð4Þ
On the other hand, the expected increase of degree in the
interval (t,t+tD) only has the contribution from newcomers flow
and takes the form (recall that new nodes are generated with the
same probability to be cooperators or defectors)
Dki~Dflowki~2Dflowkc
i: ð5Þ
If the fitness (hence connectivity) of node i is high enough as to
attract a significant part of the newcomers flow, the first term in
Eq. (3) dominates at short time scales, and then the hub degree ki
increases exponentially. Connectivity patterns are then dominated
by the growth by preferential attachment, ensuring as in the
Baraba ´si-Albert [3] model that the network will have a SF degree
distribution. Moreover, the rate of increase
Dflowkc
i~
1
2
mtD
fi P
j fj
ð6Þ
is larger for a defector hub (by a factor b) because of its larger
fitness, and then one should expect hubs to be mostly defectors, as
confirmed by the results shown in Fig. 4. This small set of most
connected defector nodes attracts most of the newcomers flow.
On the contrary, for nodes of intermediate degree, say of
connectivity m%ki%kmax, the term Dflowfi in Eq. (3) can be
neglected, i.e., the arrival of new nodes is a rare event, so that for a
large time scale, k ˙
i=0. Note that if k ˙
i(t)=0 for all t in an interval
t0#t#t0+T, the size of the neighborhood is constant during the
whole interval T and thus the evolutionary dynamics of strategies
through imitiation is the exclusive responsible for the strategic field
configuration in the neighborhood of node i. During these stasis
periods the probability distribution of strategies approaches that of
a static network in the neighborhood of node i. It is clear that this
scenario can be occasionally subject to sudden (avalanche-type of)
perturbations following ‘‘punctuated equilibrium’’ patterns in the
rare ocasions in which a new node arrive. Recalling that the
probability for this node i of intermediate degree to be a
cooperator is large in the static regime [8] we then arrive to the
conclusion that for these nodes the density of cooperators must
reach a maximum, in agreement with Fig. 4. Furthermore, our
simulations show that these features of the shape of the curve are
indeed preserved as time goes by, giving further support to the
above argument based on time scale separation and confirming
that our understanding of the mechamisms at work in the model is
correct.
Conclusions
In summary, we have presented a model in which the rules
governing the formation of the network are linked to the dynamics
of its components. The model provides an evolutionary explana-
tion for the origin of the two most common types of networks
found in natural systems: When the selection pressure is weak,
homogeneous networks arise, whereas strong selection pressure
gives rise to scale-free networks. A remarkable fact is that the
proposed evolution rule gives rise to complex networks that share
many topological features with those measured in real systems,
such as the power law dependence of the clustering coefficient with
the degree of the nodes. Interestingly, our results make it clear that
the microscopic dynamical organization of strategists in evolu-
tionarily grown networks is very different from the case in which
the population evolves on static networks. Furthermore, as we
have seen, the generated networks are robust in the sense that after
the growth process stops, the dynamical behavior keeps its
character.
Thinking of the specific application we are discussing here, the
emergence of cooperation, it is particularly remarkable the special
role of individuals with an intermediate number of connections. As
we have reasoned above, as time proceeds and the network grows,
cooperation increases by invading those intermediate nodes, and
on the other hand the range of intermediate degrees grows as well,
leading to further increase of cooperation. On the contrary, hubs
or well connected nodes, which on the static scenario are the
supporters of cooperation, in the evolutionary process are
defectors that thrive and accumulate new nodes by being so, only
to fall eventually in the class of intermediate degree nodes and
become cooperators. The analogy with the effect of a well-doing
middle class in a western-like society is tempting but would of
course be too far-fetched to push it beyond a general resemblance.
Nevertheless, one particular situation in which models like this,
based on the evolutionary preferential attachment mechanism,
may prove very relevant is in the formation of social networks of
entrepreneurs or professionals, such as those studied in Silicon
Valley [25,26]. The way these networks grow upon arrival of new
individuals and subsequent cooperative interactions made them a
natural scenario to apply these ideas in detail. Finally, another
important conclusion is the resilience of the cooperative behavior
arising in these networks, in so far as it does not decrease for a
wide range of parameters upon stopping the growth process, and,
in most cases it even exhibits a large increase of the cooperation
level.
On more general theoretical grounds, figuring out why scale-
free networks are so ubiquitous in Nature is one of the most
challenging aspects of modern network theory. At variance with
previous hypotheses, the evolutionary preferential attachment
mechanism of Eq. (2) naturally incorporates a competition
between structural and dynamical patterns and hence it suffices
to explain why SF networks are optimized to show both structural
and dynamical robustness. The former is given by the scale-free
nature of the resulting topology, while the latter is based on the
high levels of cooperation attained in the grown networks. Note
that this optimization acts at a local level since individuals search
their own benefit rather than following a global optimization
scheme [27], to be compared with the fact that the resulting
network has a very good cooperation level as a whole. Finally, we
let for future research the question of whether Eq. (2) can be
applied to other sort of dynamics by appropriately defining the
dynamical variable fi(t) and adjusting the growth rules. It is
however reasonable to assume that the functional form in Eq. (2)
may render general for generating optimized SF networks.
Complex Cooperative Networks
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